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Bank Secrecy and Criminal Matters: Cayman Islands and
U.S. Cooperative Development
Ian Paget-Brown
The purpose of this Article is to examine the development of "bank
secrecy" in the Cayman Islands, and to show the efforts made by the
Cayman Islands Government to preserve the integrity of its financial
industry.
The Cayman Islands, a British colony, lie one hour's jet flight from
Miami, Florida, and 180 miles west-northwest of Jamaica. The country
is free from all forms of direct taxation and currency restrictions.1 Its
modem laws are designed to attract international business and impose
the minimum of regulatory control.
The faith which the international business community has reposed
in the Cayman Islands as a major financial center is reflected by the eco-
nomic growth of the Islands. With a population of only 23,400, the Cay-
man Islands Government revenue rose to exceed U.S. $100 million in
1987 from about U.S. $4 million in 1970.2 Although tourism is the coun-
try's biggest economic contributor, the financial industry plays an ex-
tremely important role. In 1966 there were 17 banks licensed on the
Island; today there are more than 500, including representatives of 80%
of the world's 50 largest banks.3 Over 16,000 companies are incorpo-
rated in the Cayman Islands; as at the 1987 year end approximately 360
are engaged in international insurance business.4 As the Cayman Islands
former Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson C.B.E., J.P. said:
The value to the Cayman Islands of the financial industry is far
more than the sum total of its institutions, the services offered and the
income to the country. The most valuable asset is the confidence of the
international financial community. We must therefore do everything
to protect our good name and build on it.5
The Cayman Islands Government enacted the Confidential Rela-
L I PAGET-BROWN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 1 (2d ed. 1985).
2 Interview with Jim Graves, Cayman Islands Government Information Service, Cayman Is-
lands, June 3, 1988.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Address by the Honorable V.G. Johnson, C.B.E., J.P., Financial Secretary, 1981 Budget.
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tionships (Preservation) Law6 as a result of U.S. Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (I.R.S.) agents' activities while seeking information concerning bank
accounts of U.S. citizens in tax havens. It was discovered in 1975 that
I.R.S. agents had bribed a Bahamian immigration officer. Soon after that
it was reported that I.R.S. agents had broken into the Miami apartment
of a Bahamian bank manager while he was distracted by a female escort
provided by the I.R.S., removed his briefcase and photocopied the docu-
ments inside.7
Following these incidents, on January 12, 1976, Anthony Field was
served with a subpoena in the lobby of the Miami International Airport.
Field, a Canadian citizen and resident of the Cayman Islands, was di-
rected to appear before a Florida grand jury investigating possible viola-
tions of U.S. tax laws by customers of the Cayman Islands bank where
Field was employed.' Field was ordered to testify notwithstanding his
claim that to do so would put him in breach of Cayman Islands bank
secrecy laws.' At that time it was not clear that the Cayman Islands had
a criminal law providing for the punishment of breach of "bank secrecy".
Although section 10 of the Banks & Trust Companies Regulation Law10
provided that it would be an offense for a person to disclose information
relating to the affairs of any customer of a bank,"l the prevailing view
was that the provision was aimed at the Inspector of Banks and his staff
and did not cover persons in the position of Mr. Field. The only law that
could be relied on with certainty was the English case of Tournier v.
National Provincial and Union Bank of England 12 which applied in the
Cayman Islands. In that case the court held that a person could bring a
civil action if a bank disclosed his affairs without consent.' 3 The court
held that there was a qualified duty to keep the client's affairs confiden-
tial unless (a) disclosure was under compulsion of law; or (b) there was a
duty to the public to disclose; or (c) the interests of the bank required
disclosure; or (d) disclosure was made by the express or implied consent
of the customer. 4
The Cayman Islands Government and the private sector took the
view that given the importance to the national interests of the Cayman
Islands in preserving the integrity of its financial industry, criminal sanc-
6 The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law (Law 16 of 1976), Suppt. 4 CAYMAN Is-
LANDS GAZETTE No. 20 of 1976 [hereinafter Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law].
7 See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
8 In Re Grand Jury Proceeding (Field), 532 F. 2d. 404, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976).
9 Id.
10 Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Law, 1966 (Law 8 of 1966), Cayman Islands.
I IId.
12 1924 I K.B. 461, 1923 All E.R. 550.
13 Tournier, 1923 All E.R. at 556.
14 Id. at 554.
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tions similar to those in Switzerland should be introduced to protect
bank secrecy." The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law was
enacted with the purpose of rendering the trading in and misuse of confi-
dential information a criminal offense.'
6
Under the provisions of the Confidential Relationships (Preserva-
tion) Law whoever:
(a) being in possession of confidential information however ob-
tained (i) divulges it or (ii) attempts, offers or threatens to divulge it to
any person not entitled to possession thereof
(b) wilfully obtains or attempts to obtain confidential informa-
tion to which he is not entitled
Shall be guilty of an offense and subject to a fine and
imprisonment. 7
At the time of the coming into force of The Confidential Relation-
ships (Preservation) Law, Financial Secretary Vassel Johnson said:
Concern was expressed during 1976 by the financial community
over a case in which a Cayman-based offshore banking institution was
the subject of an inquiry by a foreign government. This arose from a
continuing investigation into tax haven operations by large metropoli-
tan countries. These countries are concerned that their tax laws may
be breached by citizens who use tax haven facilities. From our point of
view, the financial industry is a prominent part of the local economy
and we must therefore continue to welcome any investor who chooses
to do business in the Cayman Islands. Those who are conducting off-
shore business must ensure that their activities abroad do not infringe
regulations of other jurisdictions. It should be made clear that a tax
offense in other countries is not an offense in the Cayman Islands.
Under the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law recently en-
acted, no information relating to a customer or client account with any
institution within the local financial community can be divulged to
anyone. If a foreign government is investigating a case relating to a
crime other than a tax offense, and the Government of the Cayman
Islands is requested to assist in providing relevant information, the law
provides that application for such information be made through the
local police to the governor in Executive Council. Such request would
be examined if the purported offense would, if committed in the Cay-
man Islands be an offense under Cayman statutes.'
8
In 1979, the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law was
15 PAGET-BROWN, supra note 1, at 142.
16 The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, supra note 6.
17 Id. § 4.
18 PAGET-BROWN, supra note 1, at 142.
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amended.19 The new provisions specify that any person who intends or
is required to give evidence of confidential information shall, prior to
giving evidence, apply for directions to a judge of the Grand Court.2'
The application before the Grand Court is heard while the judge is sitting
alone and, at the judge's discretion, in camera to preserve confidentiality.
Upon hearing such application the judge shall direct:
(a) that the evidence be given; or
(b) that the evidence shall not be given; or
(c) that the evidence be given subject to conditions which he may
specify whereby the confidentiality of the information is safeguarded.21
It was the intention of the Cayman Islands Government to ensure
that foreign authorities did not invade the sovereignty of the Cayman
Islands in an attempt to enforce their own revenue laws. Furthermore, it
was designed to protect people who found themselves in the position of
Mr. Field. The Cayman Islands Government was aware of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Societe International v. Rogers22 regarding the
production of documents from Switzerland:
It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes
a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened
because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign
sovereign.23
The Cayman Islands confidentiality law was immediately attacked
by American politicians and law enforcement officials who took the view
that:
[s]ecret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institu-
tions have permitted proliferation of "white collar" crime; have served
as the financial underpinning of organized criminal operations in the
United States; have been used by Americans to evade income taxes,
conceal assets illegally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans
and others to avoid the law and regulations concerning securities and
exchanges; have served as the ultimate depository of black market pro-
ceeds from Vietnam; have served as a source of questionable acquisi-
tions, mergers and takeovers; have covered conspiracies to steal from
U.S. defense and foreign aid funds; and have served as the cleansing
agent for "hot" or illegally obtained monies.2 4
19 The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) (Amendment) Law 1979 (Law 26 of 1979), 21
CAYMAN ISLANDS GAZETrE 1979.
20 Id. § 3A(4)(ii).
21 Id. § 3A(3).
22 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
23 Id. at 197.
24 H.R. REP. No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4397.
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It was not in the interests of the Cayman Islands to be seen as a
haven to the criminal. If the offense being investigated by the United
States was recognized as an offense under Cayman Islands law, then
every assistance necessary would be provided. The provisions of the
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law have no application to the
seeking, divulging or obtaining of confidential information by a senior
Cayman Islands police officer investigating an offense committed or al-
leged to have been committed within the Cayman Islands. In addition,
the provisions do not apply to that officer, who is authorized by the Gov-
ernor to investigate an offense alleged to have been committed in a for-
eign territory provided it would be an offense if committed in the
Cayman Islands.25 The Cayman Islands wanted to cooperate, but only
according to Cayman Islands laws. Since the Cayman Islands is tax free,
an investigation into a tax offense would not receive the cooperation of
the Cayman Islands authorities.
With the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, the Cay-
man Islands rose from the ranks of those common law countries, such as
England and the United States, which merely provide for civil remedies
as between customer and bank in "bank secrecy" cases.26 The Cayman
Islands joined the ranks of civil law countries, such as Switzerland and
Luxembourg, which make breach of bank secrecy a criminal offense.2 7
The Swiss made violations of bank secrecy a criminal offense in
1934, largely to prevent Nazi agents from tracing assets deposited by
German Jews.2" Bank secrecy, however, appears to have been developed
before Roman times when temples acted as banks.2 9 Bank secrecy then
made its way into the Civil Codes and into the custom law of
merchants.30 In 1765 King Frederick the Great of Prussia protected
bank secrecy as a crime when he ordered:
We forbid, at Our Royal Disgrace, all and everybody to search
into what should stand in the folio to the credit of another person, and
none of the bank clerks shall dare to disclose such, whether by words,
signs; or in writing, or suffer loss of their employment and the penalty
expecting a perjurer .... 31
25 The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, supra note 6, § 3 (iii).
26 See, ,,g., Tournier, 1923 All E.R. 550 (England); Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83
Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) (United States).
27 See, ag., Art. 47 Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings Organizations (Switzerland); Art.
16 Law on Credit Institutions of Apr. 23, 1981 (Luxembourg).
28 Schellenberg, Bank Secrecy, 7 INT'L Bus. LAW. 221, (1979); Meier, Bank Secrecy in Swiss
And International Taxation, 7 INT'L LAw. 16, 17-20 (1973); Aubert, Swiss Bank Secrecy, Its Legal
Basis and Limits Under Domestic And International Law, 4 TAX PLANNIG INT'L 5 (Jan. 1977).
29 Meier, supra note 28, at 16.
30 Neate, Bank Secrecy, 7 INT'L Bus. LAW. 263 (1979).
31 Schneider, Bank Secrecy, 7 INT'L Bus. LAW. 230 (1979).
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As is the case in other countries which make breach of bank secrecy
a criminal offense, the Cayman Islands is a country of limited natural
resources, dependent on the area of tourism, finance and banking. It is
perfectly natural that the Cayman Islands should protect its well being in
the same way that other countries, including the United States, protect
their economies.
The attitude of the Cayman Islands Government was similar to that
expressed by the Chief Justice of the Bahamas who said in In Re Nassau
Bank and Trust Company :32
[O]ver and over, in public and in private, locally and abroad, Ba-
hamian public officials and foreign and local financial advisers, have
constantly proclaimed that accounts in Bahamian banks and trust
companies are legally protected from the prying eyes of others both
within and without the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.... The se-
crecy provision is one of the pillars of this part of our economic struc-
ture, the destruction of which would lead to the collapse of the whole
structure it supports.3 3
The Cayman Islands Government followed the position taken by the
United Kingdom government when faced with investigations by U.S. au-
thorities. In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 34 Lord
Wilberforce said:
The intervention of Her Majesty's Attorney-General establishes
that quite apart from the present case, over a number of years and in a
number of cases, the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been
against recognition of United States investigatory jurisdiction extra-
territorially against United Kingdom companies. The courts should in
such matters speak with the same voice as the executive .... they
have, as I have stated, no difficulty in doing so. 35
By enacting the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law the
Cayman Islands Government ensured that information would only be
disclosed when such disclosure was in the public interest of the Cayman
Islands. The "bank secrecy" law is similar to "blocking statutes," such
as the French Penal Code Law No. 80-538.36 The United Kingdom Pro-
32 1985 CILR 418.
33 Id.
34 1978 1 All E.R. 434, AC 547.
35 Id. at 448.
36 See Societe Nationale v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). Article IA of the French
Penal Code Law No. 80-538 provides:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and regulations, it
is prohibited for any party to request, seek, or disclose, in writing, orally or otherwise,
economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information leading
to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings
or in connection therewith....
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tection of Trading Interests Act 19807 provides that the British govern-
ment can prohibit a person in the United Kingdom from giving evidence
in connection with foreign proceedings when it is satisfied that the juris-
diction and sovereignty of the United Kingdom has been prejudiced.
Other countries have also introduced statutes imposing criminal penal-
ties to deter any act which would have a detrimental effect on their
38economies.
Public interest is the foundation upon which confidentiality, includ-
ing bank secrecy laws, rests. It is therefore in the area where two states
have jurisdiction to proscribe and enforce rules of law that conflicts arise.
The courts of each country consider first and foremost the public interest
of their own nation when balancing the interests of a foreign sovereign.
Crimes used to be altogether local, recognizable and punishable ex-
clusively in the country where they were committed. Chief Justice Mar-
shall, the first U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice, said "No country
executes the penal laws of another. '39 It has always been a principle of
international law that an act of sovereignty can have no effect in the terri-
tory of another state. Today, however, criminals operate internationally
to avoid detection. The Cayman Islands Government recognized that
the same strict confidentiality law which provided security to bona fide
business might also attract criminal elements attempting to hide their ill-
gotten gains. The then Governor of the Cayman Islands, Peter Lloyd,
stated the matter clearly when he addressed the Cayman Islands Bankers
Association in July 1982:
[T]he private sector must play its part too to maintain the stand-
ing and reputation of the Cayman Islands' financial industry .... any
offshore tax haven with a very strict confidentiality law may be abused
by people seeking a repository for dirty money whether this be the
proceeds of fraud, or theft or of the narcotics trade .... Banks and
others in the private sector must bear the main responsibility for the
necessary vigilance for insuring, by self-regulation, that our financial
industry is clean.4°
The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law did not mean
Id.
37 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 (c. li).
38 Australia: Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act 1976; Canada (Onta-
rio): Business Records Protection Act 1947; Canada (Quebec): Business Concerns Records Act
1964; Federal Republic of Germany: Law on Federal Duties in Matters Concerning Shipping, 24
May 1965; Italy: Shipping Documents Act 1980; South Africa: Protection of Business Act 1978;
Sweden: Ordinance Regarding the Prohibition in Certain Cases for Shipowners to Produce Docu-
ments Concerning the Swedish Shipping Industry, 13 May 1966.
39 In Re Nassau Bank 1985 CILR 418; A.V. DicEy & J.H.C. MoIs, THE CoNFLICr OF
LAws 77 (9th ed. 1973).
40 Address by His Excellency Mr. G. Peter Lloyd, Govornor of the Cayman Islands, Cayman
Islands Bankers Association, as reported in the Daily Caymanian Compass, July 8, 1982, at 1.
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that the Cayman Islands refused all cooperation in the international fight
against crime. The Cayman Islands law provided the same procedures as
is common among nations where international comity exists. Under the
Hague Convention on Evidence, assisting foreign courts in the taking of
evidence in both civil or commercial matters is mandated."a By statutory
instrument, Her Majesty's Government extended to the Cayman Islands
the provisions of the United Kingdom's Evidence (Proceedings in Other
Jurisdictions) Act 1975,42 giving effect to the relevant Hague Convention
and empowering the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands to exercise ju-
risdiction to grant requests for international judicial assistance.43 The
Cayman Islands Chief Justice Sir John Summerfield Q.C. said in United
States of America v. Carver:'
It is the duty and the pleasure of the Court... to do all it can to
assist the foreign court just as the Court ... would expect the foreign
court to help it in like circumstances.... As a matter of jurisdiction,
in the ordinary way and in the absence of evidence to the contrary...
the Court should be prepared to accept the statement of a foreign court
in its request that the evidence is required... for the purposes of civil
and criminal proceedings. On the other hand, the form of the letter of
request is not conclusive; the Court must examine the request objec-
tively by the nature of the testimony sought, and it has to look at the
substance of the matter... the Court has power to accept or reject the
foreign request in whole or in part, whether as to oral or documentary
evidence and it can and should delete from the foreign request any
parts that are excessive either as regards witnesses or as regards docu-
ments.... This Court must also take into account the Confidential
Relationships (Preservation) Law and its purpose. While this country
holds itself out as a tax haven, it does not aim to become a haven for
illicit spoils. In particular, this Court will give all the assistance the
law allows in bringing criminals to justice who are guilty of fraud or
theft. But it must also insist that a proper case be made out for the
release of protected information where the law allows such release.
Further, the Court will not allow process under the Order as a means
of invading sovereignty.45
The intention of the Cayman Islands Government was that the
United States should follow the procedures of the Hague Convention
41 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar.
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 7444.
42 Statutory Instrument No. 1890 of 1978 entitled The Evidence (Proceedings in Other Juris-
dictions) (Cayman Islands) Order 1978 whereby Her Majesty in Council extended to the Cayman
Islands the provisions of the U.K.'s Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (c. 34)
giving statutory force to the Hague Convention.
43 Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975 (c. 34).
44 Unreported Cayman Islands case in relation to United States v. Carver, 671 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (heard on June 4, 1982).
45 Id.
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when seeking evidence in the Cayman Islands. This was the case in Ings
v. Furgeson,4 where subpoenas duces tecum were served on the New
York agencies of The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto Dominion
Bank.47 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that since the Law of
Quebec prohibited the banks and their employees from sending outside
the Province any of the documents demanded, the subpoenas should be
quashed because the proper procedure would be to comply with the stat-
utes enacted under the Hague Convention.48 The Court said:
Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts
dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action
as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the
least an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures. Whether re-
moval of records from Canada is prohibited is a question of Canadian
law and best resolved by the Canadian courts. 49
The Hague Convention is currently in force between the United
States and Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden and the United
Kingdom (including the Cayman Islands).50
The U.S. law enforcement authorities, however, decided that the ex-
isting international structure of cooperation was unsatisfactory for its
purposes. Their problem was two-fold. In the first place, the taking of
evidence abroad under the Hague Convention applies only to courts and
not to the seeking of evidence by U.S. grand juries.5 1 In the second place,
the United States complained about the expense:
[We do not view this costly, time consuming method to offer a
viable, long term solution to the problem of obtaining foreign bank
records. This is wholly unsatisfactory and altogether too expensive. It
is the position of the Department of Justice that the foreign govern-
ment should represent the U.S. in its requests for information in for-
eign courts.... 52
The position of the United States is that the Hague Convention is
not the exclusive method by which evidence located in a foreign country
46 282 F. 2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 152.
49 Id.
50 See Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2545.
51 See Rio Tonto Zinc v. Westinghouse 1978 1 All E.R. 434 at 451 (House of Lords decision,
Viscownt Dilhorne's opinion).
52 D. Lowell Jenson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Division U.S. Dept. of Justice. Evidence
Before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Concerning Law Enforcement
Problems Arising from Foreign Bank Secrecy Laws and Proposed Remedies, Mar. 15, 1983, at 218.
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can be obtained.53 The use of a subpoena may be more desirable. It has
been reported that the attitude of the Justice Department in its quests to
obtain evidence located abroad has caused friction between the Justice
Department and the State Department. 54  The Washington Post
reported:
In one case after another, the Justice Department has become an
aggressive player on the international stage, a role that has produced a
growing degree of friction with Secretary of State George P. Schultz
and his senior staff.
Such conflicts are inevitable between departments with different
mandates-one tightly focused on law enforcement, the other with
broad concerns about U.S. relations world wide .... 'We've had some
real wrestling matches, no question about it .... some differences in
approach. Where you get the charge that we're selling out to maintain
good relations is from the U.S. attorneys who are not familiar with
international procedures . . . demands for evidence abroad create a
foreign policy conflict ... you have to do a bit of negotiating with the
other country to get what you want.' One such battle occurred two
years ago when Justice Department investigators demanded the
records of a Canadian bank with a branch in a Caribbean tax haven.
The Canadian prime minister complained to [President] Reagan about
the subpoena and the State Department officials accompanied Cana-
dian diplomats to a tense meeting at the Justice Department ...
Sources said then Attorney General William French Smith refused to
back off, saying drug traffickers frequently hide money in offshore tax
havens and the Justice would not be thwarted by foreign bank secrecy
laws. The Justice Department eventually won access to the bank
records leading to the conviction of a Florida businessman for tax
evasion.... .'
By using the subpoena power against foreign banks, the United
States caused the banks to be subject to conflicting laws. Doubtless, the
United States has jurisdiction over its citizens both within and without
the United States. It also has jurisdiction over all persons who purpose-
fully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the
United States and thereby invoke the benefits and protection of its laws.
For example, In re Grand Jury 81-2,56 a grand jury sitting in the Western
District of Michigan, called for the production of customer bank records
held by the Deutsche Bank, AG in Germany.57 The subpoenas were
served on the bank's New York agency.58 The bank had been ordered by
53 Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2542.
54 Global Role of Justice Dept. is Irritant at State, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1986, at A1, col. 1.
55 Id.
56 550 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
57 Id. at 25.
58 Id.
Vol. 20:369
BANK SECRECY AND CRIMINAL MATTERS
the German authorities not to comply with the request. The court said:
It is clear that if the Deutsche Bank AG were not doing business
in the United States, this court would have no jurisdiction to order
compliance by the bank with these subpoenas . . ., [h]owever, the
maintenance by Deutsche Bank AG of an active branch office in New
York provides sufficient evidence that the bank "purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the (United States)
... thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws... In short,
the bank's argument that the records in Germany are beyond the juris-
dictional reach of these subpoenas and the orders of this court ignores
the continuous and systematic presence of the bank in the United
States and attempts to dodge the obligations that presence imposes on
the bank with respect to American law. It is not the agent of the bank
to whom the grand jury addressed its subpoenas, but the bank itself
and that bank is found operating in the United States. .. 9
The fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "no per-
son shall be required to answer for a capital or other infamous crime
unless presented with a grand jury indictment".' Grand juries are arms
of the courts and are designed to hear evidence presented to it by a prose-
cutor concerning offenses arising in the jurisdiction in which they sit. If
a grand jury determines that it would like to hear witnesses or evidence
not presented to them by the prosecutor, it has the power to subpoena
witnesses or documents either directly or through the prosecutor.61 The
U.S. courts are reluctant to countenance any device which puts relevant
information beyond the reach of an impaneled grand jury or impede or
delay its proceeding. Judge Learned Hand put the issue in perspective
many years ago when he said:
the suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best more especially
where as here the inquiry concerns the public interest. It can be justi-
fied at all only where the opposing private interest is supreme.6 2
No area in international legal affairs has, in my opinion, caused
more tension between governments than this investigative power of
United States grand juries. For many years now the United States has
sought to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners with respect to acts outside
the jurisdiction of that country.
The frequently cited reference in case law involving the enforcement
of a subpoena outside the United States is the Restatement (Second) For-
59 Id. at 27.
60 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
61 See Hemmings v. Coleman, 187 So. 793 (Fla. 1939).
62 McMarm v. S.E.C., 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, McMann v. Engle, 301 U.S. 684
(1937).
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eign Relations Law of the United States.63 Section 40 reads:
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules
of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law to
consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement ju-
risdiction, in light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place
within the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed
by that state.
The most recent draft of Restatement (Revised) section 437
provides:
(1)(a) Where authorized by statute or rule of court, a court in
the United States may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to pro-
duce documents, objects, or other information directly relevant, neces-
sary, and material to an action or investigation, even if the information
or the person in possession of the information is outside the United
States.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may
subject the person to whom the order is directed to sanctions, includ-
ing the finding of contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default
judgment, or may lead to a determination by the court that the facts to
which the order was addressed are as asserted by the opposing party.
(c) In issuing an order directing production of information lo-
cated abroad, a court in the United States should take into account the
importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other
information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether
the information originated in the United States; the extent to which
compliance with the request would undermine important interests of
the state where the information is located; and the possibility of alter-
native means of securing the information. 64
The case law on this subject has been consistent; while bank secrecy
laws will be taken into account, they generally have carried very little
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
64 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 437(l)(a)-(1)(c) (Tent. Draft
No. 6, Vol. 1, Apr. 1980) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT REVISED].
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weight.65 As stated in United States v. Davis:66
The United States has a strong interest in the effective enforce-
ment of its criminal laws.... Furthermore the Cayman Bank records
were essential to the Government's case.... In contrast, while the
Cayman Islands has a vital national interest in preserving the privacy
of its banking customers, the statute does not provide a blanket guar-
antee of privacy and has many exceptions .... In addition, since
American citizens are required to reveal the existence of foreign bank
accounts and report certain foreign transactions by American law,
Cayman national interests are not impinged upon and to the extent
that the subpoenaed records contain information which Davis was re-
quired to disclose under American Law. We also note that the Cay-
man Attorney General, after consultation with the United States
Government, agreed to support the Bank's efforts to obtain a Cayman
court order authorizing the disclosure of the records.... Further-
more, the Cayman Islands has a policy against the use of its business
secrecy laws to encourage or foster criminal activities.... The court
therefore concludes that Cayman has no strong national policy inter-
ests which would be affected by disclosure of Davis' bank records.67
The U.S. Constitution68 provides in part that Congress shall have
the power to regulate commerce among foreign nations and among the
several states. It is this commerce power which the U.S. Supreme Court
has acknowledged gives Congress the jurisdiction to enact Federal crimi-
nal laws.6 9 Congress has the inherent power to establish criminal penal-
ties for actions that interfere with any Federal interest.7' This authority
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce enables Congress to enact
criminal laws which not only have force in the United States but also
have an extraterritorial effect.7 For example, the U.S. securities laws
provide that a willful violation of the substantive provisions of the securi-
ties statutes, or a rule or regulation promulgated under the statutes, will
65 United States v. First National Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); In Re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983); Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Finesilver,
546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italianna, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In Re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir.
1984); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In Re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940; United States v.
Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981).
66 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
67 Id. at 1035.
68 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
69 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (V.
Nanda & M. Bassiouni eds. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW].
70 U.S. CONST. art L § 8.
71 Id.
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be a felony.72 The preservation of fairness in the U.S. capital markets is
essential, otherwise there would be two sets of law enforcement rules, one
standard for those trading from within the United States and a lesser
standard for those trading beyond U.S. borders.
The new offense of laundering monetary instruments under 18
U.S.C. 1956, can operate outside as well as inside the United States.73
Chemical Bank, the sixth largest commercial bank in the United States,
became the first financial institution to be indicted for laundering the
money of narcotics dealers.74 In March 1985, the Permanent Investiga-
tions Committee's report on Crime and Bank Secrecy7" noted that bank
secrecy in foreign jurisdictions plays a prominent role in international
activity affecting the United States.7 6
The President's Commission on Organized Crime Interim Report:
"The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and
Money Laundering"77 reported that money laundering is the life blood of
organized crime. "The driving force of organized crime is the incentive
to earn vast amounts of money, and without the ability to utilize its ill-
gotten gains, the Underworld will have been dealt a crippling blow."7"
An illustration of the extraterritorial effect of U.S. criminal laws is
the recent decision in United States v. Inco Bank & Trust Corp. , which
held that a member of a criminal conspiracy which takes place both in
the United States and in a foreign country can be convicted of engaging
in the conspiracy even if he performs no overt act within the United
States. 0 Inco Bank is a Cayman Islands bank and maintains accounts at
several banks in Florida. Inco Bank was charged with conspiring to
smuggle money from the United States to the Cayman Islands. U.S. cus-
toms laws require any person transporting cash or monetary instruments
valued at more than $10,000 into or out of the United States to file a
Currency and Monetary Instrument Report disclosing the source and
72 Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain Evidence
Abroad, 18 INT'L L. 89 (1984).
73 Laundering of Monetary Instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (added Oct. 27, 1986, P.L. 99-570,
Title I, subtitle H, § 1352 (a), 100 Stat. 3207-18).
74 President's Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President and the At-
torney General, The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money Laun-
dering, Hearing II Mar. 14, 1984.
75 Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, S. REP. No. 99-130, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
76 Pursuant to Executive Order 12435 and Public Law 98-368.
77 Letter of Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman of President's Commission on Organized Crime
submitting Interim Report at 65.
78 Id.
79 845 F.2d. 919 (11th Cir. 1988).
80 Id.
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destination of the money." In order to keep the money laundering oper-
ation secret, the conspirators planned to transport the cash outside of the
United States without filing the required report. Inco did not dispute
that the Government had established the allegations in the indictment,
but it argued that the jury should have been instructed to return a verdict
of not guilty because the evidence failed to show that Inco Bank had
committed any act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the United
States.82 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held:
It is well settled that the government has the power to prosecute
every member of a conspiracy that takes place in United States terri-
tory, even those conspirators who never entered the United States....
In this case, the conspiracy began in the United States, and although it
spread to the Cayman Islands, the conspiracy continued to function in
the United States after Inco Bank joined it. In fact Inco Bank joined
the conspiracy knowing that it would continue to operate in United
States territory. Clearly the Government has power to prosecute Inco
Bank.83
The Cayman Islands Government has made a number of efforts to
show U.S. authorities that it will work with the United States to ensure
that the Cayman Islands is not a haven for criminals. Soon after intro-
ducing its "bank secrecy law" it put into effect a "gentlemen's agree-
ment," by an exchange of letters with the U.S. Government, a which
covered circumstances under which information relating to criminal
matters could be made available to the United States outside of the
Hague Convention formalities. These procedures showed clearly that it
is the intention of the Cayman Islands Government to continue to pro-
tect the confidentiality of bona fide transactions, cooperating fully to help
prevent the country being used for the commission of criminal offenses
other than tax offenses.
The Cayman Islands followed the "gentlemen's agreement" with the
Narcotic Drugs (Evidence) (United States of America) Law 5 which was
enacted to facilitate the obtaining of evidence required in or for the pur-
81 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 providing "[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
82 Inco Bank, 845 F.2d at 919, 920.
83 Id.
84 See American Bar Association National Institute, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTI-
CAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMMODATIONS III 1925 (1984) [hereinafter TRANSNA-
TIONAL LITGATION]; Agreement Concerning Obtaining Evidence From Cayman Islands With
Regard to Narcotics Activities [Exchange of Letters], July 3, 1986, United States-United Kingdom,
26 I.L.M. 536 (1987) [hereinafter Mutual Assistance Treaty].
85 Narcotic Drugs (Evidence) (United States of America) Law (1984) (Law 17 of 1984), 24
I.L.M. 937 (1986) [hereinafter Narcotics Law]. See TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 84.
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pose of investigations and proceedings in the United States. The law pro-
vides that upon a request made by the Attorney General of the United
States to the Attorney General of the Cayman Islands arising from an
investigation into any narcotics activity, the Cayman Islands authorities
will assist in obtaining any evidence located in the Cayman Islands. 6 It
is expressly provided that the Confidential Relationships (Preservation)
Law shall not apply to anyone providing "confidential information" to
the authorities in these circumstances.8 7
The Cayman Islands government, like the United Kingdom gov-
ernment, United States government, Canadian government and the
Western European governments, has pledged to stop the human suffer-
ing and disaster which result from the use of narcotic drugs in the
world. The main method of dealing with drug traffickers is to stop the
profits being derived from drugs which may be hidden in offshore
countries...."
Following the enactment of the Law the Cayman Islands Govern-
ment has complied with 57 requests for confidential information by U.S.
authorities investigating drug offenses.8 9 The U.S. Justice Department
announced that the law has led to 65 indictments and the forfeiture of
$15 million.9"
The cooperation by the Cayman Islands Government did not pre-
vent the United States from ignoring the Hague Convention, and the
"gentlemen's agreement." The authorities continued to use grand jury
subpoenas to obtain information required for tax investigations. U.S.
courts have made it clear that they will not allow "bank secrecy" statutes
to thwart them in their goal of ensuring that all U.S. taxpayers comply
with U.S. revenue laws.91
In Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States92 the Court said:
The vital interest of the United States, or any state for that matter,
in enforcement of its tax laws is unquestionable.... [T]axes are the life
blood of government and their prompt and certain availability an im-
perious need.... On the other hand the interest of Hong Kong in
maintaining its banking secrecy doctrine, a commercial concern, does
not directly involve an express statutory concern vital to the govern-
86 Narcotics Law, supra note 85.
87 Id. § 9.
88 Government Information Services Release, The Hon. Thomas Jefferson, Financial Secretary
of the Cayman Islands, (Aug. 9, 1984).
89 Caymanian Compass, July 22, 1988, p. 2, col. 3 (Richard Ground Q.C. the Attorney Gen-
eral of the Cayman Islands said: "most of the requests were made at the beginning of the initial
period. We have had very few requests in recent months.").
90 13 NAT'L L. J. 47 (Nov. 1986).
91 United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
92 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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ment itself ... I find that the interest of the United States in enforcing
its tax laws significantly outweighs Hong Kong's interest in preserving
bank secrecy. 93
In In Re Grand Jury 83-84 [Fl], Ian Falconer, a Cayman Islands lawyer,
was served with a subpoena while on a cricket tour in the United
States.94 Evidence was introduced to show that neither Falconer nor his
firm had an office in the United States and that he was only an intermedi-
ary and not a target of the investigation. U.S. authorities provided no
help to Falconer when he requested their assistance in making an appli-
cation to the Grand Court under the Confidential Relationships (Preser-
vation) Law which would then allow him to give evidence.95 All the
Americans would say was that the information was needed for a tax
fraud case, and Falconer was held in contempt when he refused to testify
without the permission of the Grand Court.9 6
On February 28, 1984, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida filed an order imposing a $1.825 million fine on the Bank
of Nova Scotia for failure to comply with a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum calling for the production of documents located in the Cayman
Islands.9 7 The order was fied notwithstanding that the governments of
the Cayman Islands and the United Kingdom and the Canadian Bankers
Association joined the Bank in its application to have the subpoena
quashed.98 The Bank of Nova Scotia had been enjoined by the Grand
Court of the Cayman Islands from obeying the subpoena and the Bank
was forced to choose between two conflicting court orders. 99
The most recent example of international banks being subject to
conflicting law is shown by the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Doe v. United States.100 Doe had appeared before a Federal grand jury in
93 Id.
94 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, at 313 (1987).
95 The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) (Amendment) Law 1979 (Law 26 of 1979).
96 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69.
97 In the Cayman Islands, At. Gen. v. BNS, 1985 CILR 418, a U.S. citizen was an authorized
signatory in the bank account of a Cayman company. In 1985 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit ordered him to sign a "consent directive" to authorize the Bank to make disclosure to
U.S. authorities. The learned Chief Justice of the Cayman Islands held:
A "consent directive" given under compulsion, with the threat of contempt proceed-
ings and fines and/or imprisonment in the event of refusal, is merely submission to force
and is not consent for the purposes of (The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law
1976 (as amended)). Section 3(2)(b)(i) which requires consent to be given voluntarily.
Consent to disclosure, in my view means voluntarily agreeing to disclose... I am giving a
construction to the word "consent" in that provision that I believe the legislature in-
tended-its ordinary, natural meaning.
Id. at 426.
98 In re ABC Limited, 1984 CILR 130.
99 Id.
100 108 S. Ct. 2341(1988)(decided June 22, 1988).
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Texas pursuant to a subpoena that directed him to produce records of
transactions in accounts at three named banks in the Cayman Islands
and Bermuda. The U.S. branches of the three banks were also served
with subpoenas commanding them to produce records of accounts over
which Doe had signatory authority. °10 The banks refused to comply cit-
ing their governments' bank secrecy laws. The Cayman Islands bank
relied on the Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law as
amended.1 2 The Bermuda bank relied on Bermuda common law pursu-
ant to which "no Bermuda bank may release information in its posses-
sion concerning its customer's affairs unless (1) it is ordered to do so by a
court of competent jurisdiction in Bermuda, or (2) it receives a specific
written direct from its customer requesting the bank to release such
information." 103
The Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Government had not yet
sought contempt sanctions against the banks. Doe refused to sign twelve
forms consenting to disclosure of bank records. He was held in civil con-
tempt and ordered confined until he complied with the order. Justice
Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.1"
The Petitioner's sole claim is that his execution of the consent
forms directing the banks to release records as to which banks believe
he has the right of withdrawal has independent testimonial significance
that will incriminate him, and that the Fifth Amendment prohibits
governmental compulsion of that act.
The question on which this case turns is whether the act of exe-
cuting the form is a "testimonial communication."...1o5
The Supreme Court held that the consent directive itself was not
testimonial, Doe's compelled act of executing the form had no testimo-
nial significance, and that his execution of the forms did not admit or
assert his consent. The Court said:
The form does not state that Doe "consents" to the release of the
bank records. Instead, it states that the directive "shall be construed
as consent" with respect to Cayman Islands and Bermuda bank-se-
crecy laws.... When forwarded to the bank along with the subpoena,
the executed directive, if effective under local law, will simply make it
possible for the recipient bank to comply with the Government's re-
quest to produce such records.106
The Supreme Court noted:
101 Id. at 2344.
102 Id. at 2343-44.
103 Id. at 2343-44 and 2343 n.l.
104 Id. at 2345.
105 Id. at 2346, 2349.
106 Id. at 2349.
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The effectiveness of the directive under foreign law has no bearing
on the constitutional issue of this case. Nevertheless, we are not una-
ware of the international comity questions implicated by the Govern-
ment's attempts to overcome protections afforded by the laws of
another nation. We are not called upon to address those questions
here. 107
The Cayman Islands Government had filed a brief as amicus curiae
bringing to the courts attention that a consent directive signed pursuant
to an order of a U.S. court and at the risk of contempt sanctions could
not constitute consent under the Cayman Islands confidentiality law.108
In In re ABC, Ltd. 09 Chief Justice Summerfield wrote:
Although in form the consent directive purports to be a consent
and direction given by the client of the bank it is in substance a direc-
tion given by the foreign court. It is not real consent at all.... In
effect the foreign court is usurping the power to order disclosure and,
in doing so, completely by-passing the [section] 3A procedure under
that Law .... In short, consent given under compulsion is merely
submission to force .... 11l
The Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Justice Department had ob-
served that the decision in In Re ABC, Ltd. "l' had not been appealed and
argued accordingly that Cayman law on the point had not been definitely
settled."I2 That is, in the writer's opinion, a strange submission to make,
or indeed to be persuaded by. Surely the rule is that in the absence of
appeal or conflicting authority the decision of In Re ABC, Ltd. does rep-
resent the settled law of the land. Apparently it was not brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court that, in the year following the decision of
In re ABC, Ltd. Chief Justice Summerfield said in Att. Gen. v. BNS:113
[T]his Court has already expressed its views in In re ABC, Ltd....
I find no reason to [retreat] from the views and conclusions expressed
in that case. I adopt them for the purpose of this application and ad-
here to the view that purported consent reflected in such a "consent
directive" given under compulsion, with threat of contempt proceed-
ings and fines and/or imprisonment in the event of refusal, is merely
submission to force and is not consent for the purpose of [section]
3(2)(b)(i) which requires consent to be given voluntarily." 14
The learned Chief Justice of the Cayman Islands observed that the
107 Id. at 2366.
108 Id. at 2369.
109 See id. at 2351 n.16.
110 1984 CILR 130.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 134.
113 Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2341 at 2369.
114 1985 CILR 418.
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"consent directive" of the U.S. court was an infringement of Cayman
Islands sovereignty.115 He noted that English Courts were very sensitive
to orders which might be seen as an infringement of sovereignty of U.S.
courts. This principle was illustrated in MacKinnon v Donaldson Lufkin
Corp.116 when Justice Hoffman set aside a subpoena served on the
London branch of Citibank, New York in respect to an English action
saying:
The content of the subpoena and order is to require the produc-
tion by a non-party of documents outside the jurisdiction concerning
business which it has transacted outside the jurisdiction. In principle
and on authority it seems to me that the court should not, save in
exceptional circumstances, impose such a requirement on a foreigner,
and in particular, on a foreign bank.... If every country where a bank
happened to carry on business asserted a right to require that bank to
produce documents relating to accounts kept in any other such coun-
try, banks would be in the unhappy position of being forced to submit
to whichever sovereign was able to apply the greatest pressure. I have
stated the principle as being a self-imposed limitation on a state's sov-
ereign authority.1 1
7
From the above, it will be seen that a better way has to be found to
ensure cooperation between the United States and the Cayman Islands
rather than confrontation. The legitimate interests of the United States
must be respected, while at the same time ensuring that the sovereignty
and public interest of the Cayman Islands is protected.
Fortunately, an understanding had been reached by the govern-
ments of the Cayman Islands and the United States that if the Narcotics
Agreement worked satisfactorily the Cayman Islands Government would
negotiate a wider enforcement treaty to cover crimes other than narcotics
offenses. Thus on July 3, 1986, the Treaty relating to the Mutual Assist-
ance in Criminal Matters118 was executed by representatives of the Cay-
man Islands, United Kingdom and United States governments.
The treaty sets the stage for the future economic well being of the
country, which will preserve the offshore financial center intact and
give the [United States] nothing but the right to pursue their criminals
in our country and according to our laws. 119
The Cayman Islands legislature gave effect to the terms of the
Treaty by the enactment of the Mutual Legal Assistance (United States
115 Id. at 426.
116 Id. at 431.
117 1986 1 All E.R. 653.
118 Id. at 658.
119 Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,
July 3, 1986, United States-United Kingdom, 26 I.L.M. 536 (1987) [hereinafter Legal Assistance
Treaty].
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of America) Law. 120 The Treaty was transmitted by President Reagan to
the Senate with a view to receiving its advice and consent on August 4,
1987, and awaits ratification. This 1986 Treaty provides for a broad
range of cooperation in criminal matters. Mutual assistance available
under the Treaty includes: (1) executing requests relating to criminal
matters by undertaking diligent efforts, including the necessary adminis-
trative or judicial action such as the issuance of subpoenas and the execu-
tion of search warrants;121 (2) taking of testimony or statements of
persons by noncompulsory or compulsory measures; 22 (3) effecting the
production, preservation, and authentication of documents, records or
articles of evidence;123 (4) providing assistance in proceedings for forfei-
ture or restitution of proceeds of an offense or for imposing fines; 24
(5) serving judicial documents, writs, summonses, records of judicial ver-
dicts, and court judgments and decisions;' 25 (6) effecting the appearance
of a witness before a court; 126 (7) locating persons127 and (8) providing
judicial records, evidence, and information. 128
The Treaty, unlike the Hague Convention, permits mutual assist-
ance at the investigative stage and in grand jury proceedings, thus ad-
dressing U.S. concerns. 129 The offenses covered by the Treaty are those
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment in both countries, and
the crimes of: racketeering, drug trafficking, failing to report transfer of
illegally acquired money, failing to report the transfers of illegally ac-
quired funds, insider security practices, 30 and violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.'
31
It is most important to note that the Treaty permits the denial of
assistance in matters relating directly to the regulation of taxes unless the
offenses are related to narcotics trafficking, or fraudulent promotion of
tax shelters, or certain other offenses in connection with illegally ob-
tained income. 132 The Chief Justice of the Cayman Islands, or a judge
acting on his behalf, may refuse a request from the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral if it is in the "public interest" of the Cayman Islands to do so, and
120 Debate on the Treaty in the Cayman Islands Legislative Assembly, Sept. 4, 1986, The Hon.
Vassell Johnson C.B.E., J.P. Member of Executive Council.
121 Legal Assistance Treaty, supra note 119, art. 5(1).
122 Id. art. 8(1), 14(1).
123 Id. art. 8(1), art. 10(1).
124 Id. art. 8(1), 8(5).
125 Id. art. 16(2).
126 Id. art. 13(1).
127 Id. art. 10.
128 Id. art. 12(1).
129 Id. art. 1(1).
130 Id. art. 19(3).
131 Id. art. 19(3)(i).
132 Id. art. 19(3)(e).
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where the request does not establish "reasonable ground" for believing
that the specified offense has been committed. 133
The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law does not apply
to any person required to give evidence or produce documents before the
Chief Justice of the Cayman Islands in the exercise of his administrative
authority under the Treaty. 134 Very significantly, however, article 17(3)
of the Treaty precludes the United States from enforcing any compulsory
measure, including a grand jury subpoena for the production of docu-
ments located in the Cayman Islands, unless the formalities of the Treaty
have first been observed. This clause addresses the particular British and
Cayman Islands concern with respect to bank secrecy by providing that
unilateral compulsory measures for the production of documents shall
not be enforced in the first instance.' 35
It appears that the Cayman Islands Government has been able to
reach an accord with the United States which will avoid the confronta-
tion that unilateral acts of the United States have caused. The Cayman
Islands Government has accomplished the legitimate goal of protecting
"bank secrecy" and the integrity of its financial industry. Mutual assist-
ance treaties have been concluded between the United States and Italy,
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Turkey, and have been signed with
Canada, Columbia, Morocco, Thailand, and the Bahamas. 136
The U.S. treaties on mutual assistance in criminal matters repre-
sent a step forward in international relations in that they offer rules
and procedures that greatly simplify previous practices and offer an
alternative to questionable techniques such as the kidnapping of infor-
mation in foreign countries and attempting to enforce U.S. subpoenas
in foreign jurisdiction. 137
To date, it has been reported that the treaties with Switzerland and
the Netherlands have worked to the mutual satisfaction of the countries
concerned.' 38 The U.S. Justice Department received approximately 120
requests from the Swiss for assistance and made about 250 requests
themselves.1 39 The Justice Department has received approximately 20
requests from the Netherlands and made approximately 10 requests to
the Netherlands since the coming into force of that treaty."4 It is there-
133 The Mutual Legal Assistance (United States of America) Law 1986 (Law of 1986) Suppt.
No. I Gazette No. 23 of 1986.
134 Id. § 11.
135 Letter of Submittal Department of State to the President, July 23, 1987, p. XI.
136 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, at 236.
137 Ellis and Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters A
Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189, 222 (1985).
138 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, at 268.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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fore sincerely hoped that the treaty with the Cayman Islands will like-
wise fulfill the desire of the people of the Cayman Islands. These desires
were reflected by the statement of His Excellency Mr. G. Peter Lloyd,
the Governor of the Cayman Islands, when he hailed the Treaty as a
move which would "help provide a solid foundation for the further de-
velopment of the territory's financial industry."' 141 The interests of the
United States in fighting white collar crime have been advanced and the
integrity and reputation of the Cayman Islands have been enhanced.
141 Cayman Compass, July 4, 1986.
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